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Abstract
Negotiation is a complex activity involving
strategic reasoning, persuasion, and psychol-
ogy. An average person is often far from an
expert in negotiation. Our goal is to assist hu-
mans to become better negotiators through a
machine-in-the-loop approach that combines
machine’s advantage at data-driven decision-
making and human’s language generation abil-
ity. We consider a bargaining scenario where
a seller and a buyer negotiate the price of an
item for sale through a text-based dialog. Our
negotiation coach monitors messages between
them and recommends tactics in real time to
the seller to get a better deal (e.g., “reject
the proposal and propose a price”, “talk about
your personal experience with the product”).
The best strategy and tactics largely depend on
the context (e.g., the current price, the buyer’s
attitude). Therefore, we first identify a set of
negotiation tactics, then learn to predict the
best strategy and tactics in a given dialog con-
text from a set of human–human bargaining
dialogs. Evaluation on human–human dialogs
shows that our coach increases the profits of
the seller by almost 60%.1
1 Introduction
Negotiation is a social activity that requires
both strategic reasoning and communication skills
(Thompson, 2001; Thompson et al., 2010). Even
humans require years of training to become a good
negotiator. Past efforts on building automated ne-
gotiation agents (Traum et al., 2008; Cuaya´huitl
et al., 2015; Keizer et al., 2017; Cao et al., 2018;
Petukhova et al., 2017; Papangelis and Georgila,
2015) has primarily focused on the strategic as-
pect, where negotiation is formulated as a sequen-
tial decision-making process with a discrete ac-
1The study was approved by the IRB. All sources and
data are publicly released at https://github.com/
zhouyiheng11/Negotiation-Coach.
tion space, leaving aside the rhetorical aspect. Re-
cently, there has been a growing interest in strate-
gic goal-oriented dialog (He et al., 2017; Lewis
et al., 2017; Yarats and Lewis, 2018; He et al.,
2018) that aims to handle both reasoning and text
generation. While the models are good at learn-
ing strategies from human–human dialog and self-
play, there is still a huge gap between machine
generated text and human utterances in terms of
diversity and coherence (Li et al., 2016a,b).
In this paper, we introduce a machine-in-the-
loop approach (cf. Clark et al., 2018) that com-
bines the language skills of humans and the
decision-making skills of machines in negotiation
dialogs. Our negotiation coach assists users in
real time to make good deals in a bargaining sce-
nario between a buyer and a seller. We focus on
helping the seller to achieve a better deal by pro-
viding suggestions on what to say and how to say
it when responding to the buyer at each turn. As
shown in Figure 1, during the (human–human)
conversation, our coach analyzes the current di-
alog history, and makes both high-level strategic
suggestions (e.g., 〈propose a price〉) and low-level
rhetoric suggestions (e.g., 〈use hedge words〉).
The seller then relies on these suggestions to for-
mulate their response.
While there exists a huge body of literature on
negotiation in behavioral economics (Pruitt, 1981;
Bazerman et al., 2000; Fisher and Ury, 1981; Lax
and Sebenius, 2006; Thompson et al., 2010), these
studies typically provide case studies and generic
principles such as “focus on mutual gain”. Instead
of using these abstract, static principles, we draw
insights from prior negotiation literature and de-
fine actionable strategies and tactics conditioned
on the negotiation scenario and the dialog context.
We take a data-driven approach (§2) using human–
human negotiation dialogs collected in a simulated
online bargaining setting (He et al., 2018). First,
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Figure 1: Our negotiation coach monitors the conversa-
tion between the seller and the buyer, and provides sug-
gestions of negotiation tactics to the seller in each turn
dynamically, depending on the negotiation scenario,
the dialog context, and examples of previous similar
dialogs.
we build detectors to extract negotiation tactics
grounded in each turn, such as product embellish-
ment (“The TV works like a champ!”) and side
offers (“I can deliver it to you.”) (§3.1). These
turn-level tactics allow us to dynamically predict
the tactics used in a next utterance given the dialog
context. To quantify the effectiveness of each tac-
tic, we further build an outcome predictor to pre-
dict the final deal given past tactics sequence ex-
tracted from the dialog history (§5). At test time,
given the dialog history in each turn, our coach
(1) predicts possible tactics in the next turn (§4);
(2) uses the outcome predictor to select tactics that
will lead to a good deal; (3) retrieves (lexicalized)
examples exhibiting the selected tactics and dis-
plays them to the seller (§6).
To evaluate the effectiveness of our negotiation
coach, we integrate it into He et al.’s (2018) ne-
gotiation dialog chat interface and deploy the sys-
tem on Amazon Mechanical Turk (AMT) (§7).
We compare with two baselines: the default set-
ting (no coaching) and the static coaching setting
where a tutorial on effective negotiation strategies
and tactics is given to the user upfront. The results
show that our dynamic negotiation coach helps
sellers increase profits by 59% and achieves the
highest agreement rate.
2 Problem Statement
We follow the CraigslistBargain setting of He et al.
(2018), where a buyer and a seller negotiate the
price of an item for sale. The negotiation scenario
is based on listings scraped from craigslist.
com, including product description, product pho-
tos (if available), and the listing price. In addi-
Figure 2: Negotiation interface with coaching.
tion, the buyer is given a private target price that
they aim to achieve. Two AMT workers are ran-
domly paired to play the role of the seller and the
buyer. They negotiate through the chat interface
shown in Figure 2 in a strict turn-taking manner.
They are instructed to negotiate hard for a favor-
able price. Once an agreement is reached, either
party can submit the price and the other chooses
to accept or reject the deal; the task is then com-
pleted.
Our goal is to help the seller achieve a better
deal (i.e. higher final price) by providing sugges-
tions on how to respond to the buyer during the
conversation. At each seller’s turn, the coach takes
the negotiation scenario and the current dialog his-
tory as input and predicts the best tactics to use in
the next turn to achieve a higher final price. The
seller has the freedom to choose whether to use the
recommended tactics.
3 Approach
We define a set of diverse tactics S from past study
on negotiation in behavioral economics, including
both high-level dialog acts (e.g., 〈propose a price〉,
〈describe the product〉) and low-level lexical fea-
tures (e.g. 〈use hedge words〉). Given the nego-
tiation scenario and the dialog history, the coach
takes the following steps (Figure 3) to generate
suggestions:
1. The tactics detectors map each turn to a set
of tactics in S.
2. The tactics predictor predicts the set of pos-
sible tactics in the next turn given the dia-
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Figure 3: Negotiation Coach Framework. Numbers in-
dicate the time flow.
log history. For example, if the buyer has
proposed a price, possible tactics include
proposing a counter price, agreeing with the
price etc.
3. The tactics selector takes the candidate tac-
tics from the tactics predictor and selects
those that lead to a better final deal.
4. The tactics realizer converts the selected tac-
tics to instructions and examples in natural
language, which are then presented to the
seller.
We detail each step in the following sections.
3.1 Tactics Detectors
We focus on two broad categories of strategies in
behavioral research: (i) integrative, or win–win,
negotiation, in which negotiators seek to build re-
lationships and reach an agreement benefiting both
parties; and (ii) distributive, or win–lose, negoti-
ation, in which negotiators adversarially promote
their own interests, exert power, bluff, and demand
(Walton and McKersie, 1965). In practice, effec-
tive negotiation often involves both types of strate-
gies (Fisher and Ury, 1981; Lax and Sebenius,
2006; Pruitt, 1981; K. et al., 2000, inter alia).
Prior work typically focuses on conceptual tac-
tics (e.g., emphasize mutual interest), rather than
actionable tactics in a specific negotiation sce-
nario (e.g., politely decline to lower the price, but
offer free delivery). Therefore, we develop data-
driven ways to operationalize and quantify these
abstract principles.
In Table 1, we list our actionable tactics moti-
vated by various negotiation principles. To detect
these tactics from turns, we use a mix of learned
classifiers2 for turn-level tactics (e.g., propose
prices) and regular expression rules for lexical tac-
tics (e.g., use polite words). To create the training
set for learning tactic predictors, we randomly se-
lected 200 dialogs and annotated them with tac-
tics.3 The detectors use the following features: (1)
the number of words overlapping with the product
description; (2) the METEOR score (Denkowski
and Lavie, 2014) of the turn given the product de-
scription as reference; (3) the cosine distance be-
tween the turn embedding and the product descrip-
tion embedding.4 For “Address buyer’s concerns”,
we additionally include lexical features indicating
a question (e.g.,“why”, “how”, “does”) from the
immediate previous buyer’s turns. Table 2 sum-
marizes the number pf training examples and pre-
diction accuracies for each learned classifier. For
lexical tactics, we have the following rules:
• 〈Do not propose first〉
Waiting for the buyer’s proposal allows the
seller to better estimate the buyer’s target. The
detector simply keeps track of who proposes a
price first by detecting 〈propose a price〉.
• 〈Negotiate side offers〉
The seller sometimes negotiates side offers,
e.g., offering a free gift card or free delivery. To
detect this strategy, we match the turn against
a set of phrases, e.g., “throw in”, “throwing in”,
“deliver”, “delivery”, “pick up”, “pick it up”, “in
cash”.
• 〈Use factive verbs〉
defined in (Hooper, 1975) (e.g. know);
• 〈Use hedge words〉
defined in (Hyland, 2005) (e.g. could, would);
• 〈Use certainty words〉
defined in the LIWC dictionary (Tausczik and
Pennebaker, 2010).
• 〈Communicate politely〉
We include several politeness-related negotia-
tion tactics that were identified by Danescu-
2We use `2-regularized Logistic Regression classifiers.
3Each turn can be labeled with multiple tactics.
4Sentence embeddings were calculated as the mean of the
word embeddings. We used pre-trained word2vec embed-
dings (Mikolov et al., 2013).
Principle Action Example Detector
Integrative strategies
Focus on
interests, not
positions
Describe the product “The car has leather seats.” classifier
Rephrase product description “45k miles” → “less than 50k miles” classifier
Embellish the product “a luxury car with attractive leather seats” classifier
Address buyer’s concerns “I’ve just taken it to maintainence.” classifier
Communicate your interests “I’d like to sell it asap.” classifier
Invent options
for mutual gain
Propose a price “How about $9k?” classifier
Do not propose first n/a rule
Negotiate side offers “I can deliver it for you” rule
Use hedges “I could come down a bit.” rule
Build trust
Communicate politely greetings, gratitude, apology, “please” rule
Build rapport “My kid really liked this bike, but he outgrew it.” rule
Talk informally “Absolutely, ask away!” rule
Distributive strategies
Insist on your
position
Show dominance “The absolute highest I can do is 640.0.” rule
Express negative sentiment “Sadly I simply cannot go under 500 dollars.” rule
Use certainty words “It has always had a screen protector” rule
Table 1: Actionable tactics designed based on negotiation principles. Some of them are detected by learning
classifiers on annotated data, and the rest are detected using pattern matching.
Niculescu-Mizil et al. (2013) as most informa-
tive features. They include: gratitude, greetings
, apology, “please” in the beginning of a turn,
“please” later on. Keywords matching is used
to detect these tactics.
• 〈Build rapport〉
Deepening self-disclosure, e.g., “My kid re-
ally liked this bike, but he outgrew it”, is
one strategy for building rapport. We imple-
mented three tactics detectors to identify self-
disclosure. First, we count first-person pro-
nouns (Derlaga and Berg, 1987; Joinson, 2001).
Second, we count mentions of family members
and friends, respectively (Wang et al., 2016). It
is done by matching lexicons from family and
friend categories in LIWC.
• 〈Talk informally〉
It is detected by matching the keywords in the
informal language category in LIWC.
• 〈Show dominance〉
To detect stubbornness (Tan et al., 2016), we
measure the average dominance score of all the
words from the Warriner et al.’s (2013)’s domi-
nance ratings of 14,000 words.
• 〈Express negative sentiment〉
We measure both positive and negative senti-
ment by counting words from positive and neg-
ative categories in LIWC.
Strategy # Ex Acc
Describe the product 228 0.88
Rephrase product description 136 0.74
Embellish the product 200 0.70
Address buyer’s concerns 192 0.95
Propose a price 290 0.88
Table 2: Number of turns annotated (# Ex) and pre-
diction accuracies (Acc) by 5-fold cross validation for
learned strategy predictors. Our classifiers achieve high
accuracy on all tactics.
4 Tactics Predictor
Armed with a set of negotiation tactics from the
dataset, the tactics predictor monitors a nego-
tiation conversation and, at each turn, predicts
the seller’s next move (e.g., 〈propose a price〉 or
〈express negative sentiment〉) given the current di-
alog context.
Let u1, ..., ut denote a sequence of turns, d be
a product category, and ot be a set of tactics oc-
curred in turn ut. At the (t + 1)-th turn in a dia-
log, given the current dialog context u1:t and d, we
want to predict what tactics to use in the response,
i.e. ot+1.
The dialog context is represented by embedding
the turns, tactics extracted from the turns (§3.1),
and the product being discussed. The set of tactics
o is a binary vector, where each dimension corre-
sponds to the existence of a certain tactic.
Embedding the turns Embedding of the turns
is computed using a standard LSTM encoder over
concatenated sequences of words xi in each turn:
hui = LSTM
u
(
hui−1, E
w(xi−1)
)
,
where Ew is the word embedding to be learned.
Embedding the tactics By using the tactics de-
tectors from §3.1, we extract a sequence of tactics
{mi} for each turn u in the order of their occur-
rences from left to right. For example, “Hi there,
I’ve been using this phone for 2 years and it never
had any problem.” is mapped to “〈greetings〉
〈use certainty words〉”. Given turns u1:t, we con-
catenate their tactics in order to form a single se-
quence, which is embedded by an LSTM:
hsi = LSTM
s
(
hsi−1, [E
o(mi−1); bi−1])
)
,
where Eo is the one-hot embedding and b is a bi-
nary vector encoding tactics that are not specific
to a particular word xi but occur at the turn level
(e.g. 〈describe the product〉).
Embedding the product Different products of-
ten induce different expressions and possibly dif-
ferent tactics; for example, renting an apartment
often has conversation about a parking lot while
selling a phone does not. Thus we also include
the product embedding, Ep to encode the product
category d, including car, house, electronics, bike,
furniture, and phone.
The output set of tactics ot+1 is a 24-
dimensional 5 binary vector, where each dimen-
sion represents whether a certain tactic occurred
in ut+1. Given the context embedding, we com-
pute the probability of the j-th tactic occurring in
ut+1 by
p(ot+1,j |u1:t, d) = σ(Wj [hst ;hut ;Ep(d)] + bj),
where hst and h
u
t are final hidden states of the
tactics encoder and the utterance encoder respec-
tively, andWj and bj are learnable parameters. We
train the predictor by maximizing the log likeli-
hood of tactics.
5Table 1 contains only 15 tactics because some tactics
consist of multiple sub-tactics. For example, 〈build rapport〉
includes two sub-tactics: 〈mention family members〉 and
〈mention friends〉.
4.1 Evaluation of the Tactics Predictor
We evaluate the effect of different embeddings on
predicting next tactics. We split our data into train,
held-out development (20%) and test (20%) data.
We then remove incomplete negotiation dialogs
(e.g. when the chat got disconnected in the mid-
dle). Data sizes are 1,740, 647, and 527 dialogs
for train, development and test data respectively.
We initialize word embeddings with pre-trained
word2vec embeddings. The LSTMs have 100 hid-
den units. We apply a dropout rate of 0.5 and train
for 15 epochs with SGD.
Given the output probabilities p(oj), we need a
list of thresholds γ to convert it into a binary vec-
tor, such that oj = 1(oj > γj). We choose γ
by maximizing the F1 score of the corresponding
strategy on the development set. Specifically, for
each strategy, we iterate through all threshold val-
ues [0, 1] with a step size of 0.001 and select the
one that produces the highest F1 score.
We conduct an ablation study and calculate mi-
cro and macro F1 scores. As shown in Table 3, we
achieve the best result when combining all com-
ponents.
Components Macro F1 Micro F1
Turn Embedding 0.382 0.536
+Product Embedding 0.384 0.539
+Tactics Embedding 0.397 0.592
Table 3: Effectiveness of turn, product, and tactics em-
beddings in predicting the next move.
5 Tactics Selector
The tactics predictor outputs a set of tactics ot+1,
which can be non-optimal because we only model
human behaviors. Now, we implement a tactics
selector that selects optimal tactics from ot+1 un-
der the current dialog context. The major compo-
nent of the selector is a negotiation outcome clas-
sifier. This is a supervised classifier that predicts a
binary outcome of whether the negotiation will be
successful from the seller’s standpoint. We next
describe the classifier and its evaluation.
Given negotiation tactics and word and phrase
choices used by both parties in the previous turns,
we train a `2-regularized Logistic Regression clas-
sifier to predict the negotiation’s outcome. The
outcome is defined as sale-to-list ratio r, which is
a standard valuation ratio in sales, corresponding
to the ratio between the final sale price (i.e., what
a buyer pays for the product) and the price origi-
nally listed by the seller, optionally smoothed by
the buyer’s target price (Eq. 1). If the agreed price
is between the listed price and the buyer’s budget,
then 0 ≤ r ≤ 1. If the agreed price is greater than
the listed price, then r > 1. If the agreed price
is less than the buyer’s budget, then r < 0. We
define a negotiation as successful if its sale-to-list
ratio is in the top 22% of all negotiations in our
training data; negative examples comprise the bot-
tom 22%.6
r =
sale price− buyer target price
listed price− buyer target price (1)
The features are the counts of each negotia-
tion tactic from §3.1, separately for the seller and
the buyer. A typical negotiation often involves
a smalltalk in the beginning of the conversation.
Therefore, we split a negotiation into two stages:
the 1st stage consists of turns that happen before
the first price was proposed, and the 2nd stage in-
cludes the rest. We count each tactic separately for
the two stages.
Lastly, we apply the classifier to select tactics
that will make the negotiation more successful.
For each tactic in ot+1, we assume that the seller
will use it next by modifying the corresponding
input feature in the classifier, which outputs the
probability of a successful negotiation outcome
for the seller. If the modification results in a
more successful negotiation, we select the tactic.
For example, if incrementing the input feature of
〈describe the product〉 ∈ ot+1 increases the prob-
ability outputted by the outcome classifier, we se-
lect 〈describe the product〉.
5.1 Evaluation of the Outcome Classifier
The accuracy on test data from Table 4 is given in
Table 5. We also evaluate a baseline with shallow
lexical features (1-, 2-, 3-grams).
One contribution of this work is that we not
only present abstract tactics recommendations
(e.g. 〈propose a price〉), but also propose lexical
tactics and examples from successful negotiations
(e.g. “Try to use the word would like in this sen-
tence: . . . ”). Table 6 shows that removal of the
lexical tactics drops the accuracy by 11%, which is
similar to the removal of abstract negotiation tac-
tics. We also find that it is important to separate
6The thresholds were set empirically during an early ex-
perimentation with the training data.
Total Successful Unsuccessful
Training 1,740 872 868
Dev 647 316 331
Test 527 259 268
Table 4: Statistics of dialogs, split by success-
ful/unsuccessful negotiations from the seller’s stand-
point.
Features Accuracy
Shallow features 0.60
Strategy-motivated features 0.83
Table 5: Test accuracy of the outcome classifier with
different feature groups
features in the two stages (before/after the first of-
fer). The 1st stage has weaker influence on the
success, while the removal of features in 2nd stage
makes the accuracy drop by 24%. Features from
both stages contribute to the final score.
Removed Features ∆ Accuracy
Abstract strategies -0.12
Lexical strategies -0.11
Features from the 1st stage -0.02
Features from the 2nd stage -0.24
Table 6: Ablation of each subset features shows that
lexical tactics are equally important as higher-level ab-
stract tactics and both stages contribute to the final
score.
We list seller’s top weighted negotiation tac-
tics for both stages in Table 7. 〈propose a price〉
has the highest weight, which is expected because
giving an offer is a fundamental action of nego-
tiation.7 Following that, the negative weight of
〈do not propose first〉 indicates that seller should
wait for buyer to propose the first price. It is
probably because the seller can have a better es-
timation of the buyer’s target price. The sec-
ond most weighted strategy in the 2nd stage is
〈negotiate side offers〉, which emphasizes the im-
portance of exploring side offers to increase mu-
tual gain. Moreover, building rapport can help de-
velop trust and help get a better deal, which is sup-
ported by the positive weights of 〈build rapport〉.
Interestingly, some strategies are effective only
7The reason that 〈propose a price〉 has zero weights in the
1st stage is that the 1st stage is defined to be the conversations
before any proposal is given.
in one stage, but not in the other (the strate-
gies with an opposite sign). For example,
〈talk informally〉 is more preferable in the 1st
stage where people exchange information and
establish relationship, while trying to further
reduce social distance in the 2nd can dam-
age seller’s profit. Another example is that
〈express negative sentiment〉 is not advised in the
1st stage but has a high positive weight in the 2nd
stage. Overall these make sense: to get to a better
deal the seller should be friendly in the 1st stage,
but firm, less nice, and more assertive in the 2nd,
when negotiating the price.
Features 1
st stage
Weights
2nd stage
Weights
〈propose a price〉 0.0 2.28
〈do not propose first〉 -0.62 -0.62
〈negotiate side offers〉 -0.27 1.11
〈build rapport〉 0.08 0.26
〈talk informally〉 0.39 -0.39
〈express negative sentiment〉 -0.05 0.61
Table 7: The table shows the weights of seller’s top
weighted negotiation tactics in both stages. Positive
weight means the feature is positively correlated with
the success of a negotiation.
6 Giving Actionable Recommendations
Finally, given the selected tactics, the coach pro-
vides suggestions in natural language to the seller.
We manually constructed a set of natural lan-
guage suggestions that correspond to all possi-
ble combinations of strategies. For example,
if the given tactics are {〈describe the product〉;
〈propose a price〉; 〈express negative sentiment〉},
then the corresponding suggestion is ”Reject the
buyer’s offer and propose a new price, provide a
reason for the price using content from the Prod-
uct Description.
As discussed above, we also retrieved exam-
ples of some tactics. For instance, 〈use hedges〉 is
not a clear suggestion to most people. To retrieve
best examples of 〈use hedges〉, from all the turns
that contain 〈use hedges〉 in the training data, we
choose the one that has a most similar set of tactics
to the set of tactics in the current dialog.
7 End-to-End Coaching Evaluation
We evaluate our negotiation coach by incorporat-
ing into mock negotiations on AMT. We compare
the outcomes of negotiations using our coach, us-
ing a static coach, and using no coach.
7.1 Setup and Data
We modified the same interface that was used for
collecting data in §2 for the experiments. More-
over, we created 6 test scenarios for the experi-
ments and each scenario was chosen randomly for
each negotiation task.
• No coaching For our baseline condition, we
leave the interface unchanged and collect
human–human chats without any interventions,
as described in §2.
• Static coaching We add a box called ”Nego-
tiation Tips”, which is shown in a red dashed
square in Figure 2. At the beginning of each ne-
gotiation, we ask sellers to read the tips. The
tips encourage the seller to use a subset of ne-
gotiation tactics in §3.1:
– Use product description to negotiate the price.
– Do not propose price before the buyer does.
– You can propose a higher price but also give
the buyer a gift card.
– You can mention your family when reject-
ing buyer’s unreasonable offer, e.g., my
wife/husband won’t let me go that low.
Only a subset of tactics was used: the most im-
portant and most clear tactics that fit in the rec-
ommendation window.
• Dynamic coaching We replace ”Negotiation
Tips” with ”Real-Time Analysis” box as shown
in Figure 2. When it is the seller’s turn to reply,
the negotiation coach takes the current dialog
context and updates the ”Real-Time Analysis”
box with contextualized suggestions.
We published three batches of assignments on
AMT for three coaching conditions and only al-
low workers with greater than or equal to 95% ap-
proval rate, location in US, UK and Canada to do
our assignments. Before negotiation starts, each
participant is randomly paired with another partic-
ipant and appointed to either seller or buyer. Dur-
ing negotiation, seller and buyer take turns to send
text messages through an input box. The negotia-
tion ends when one side accepts or rejects the fi-
nal offer submitted by the other side, or either side
disconnects.
We collected 482 dialogs over 3 days. We re-
moved negotiations with 4 turns or less.8 We fur-
ther remove negotiations where the seller followed
8Sometimes sellers offered a price much lower than the
listing price in order to complete the task quickly.
our suggested tactics less than 20% of the time
(only 6 dialogs are removed). Our final dataset
consists of 300 dialogs, 100 per each coaching
condition9 In the 300 final dialogs, 594 out of 600
workers were unique, only 6 workers participated
in negotiations more than once.
7.2 Result
We use two metrics to evaluate each coach-
ing condition: average sale-to-list ratio (defined
in §5) and task completion rate (%Completion),
the percentage of negotiations that have agree-
ments. Moreover, to measure increase in profits
(∆%Profit), we calculate the percentage increase
in sale-to-list ratio comparing to no coaching base-
line. The result is in Table 8. Dynamic coaching
achieves significantly higher sale-to-list ratio than
the other coaching conditions, and it also has the
highest task completion rate. Comparing with no
coaching baseline, our negotiation coach helps the
seller increase profits by 59%.
No
Coaching
Static
Coaching
Dynamic
Coaching
Sale-to-List 0.22 0.19 0.35
∆%Profit - -13.6% +59.0%
%Completion 66% 51% 83%
Table 8: Evaluation of three coaching models. Im-
provements are statistically significant (p < 0.05).
7.3 Analysis
Here, we first explore the reasons for effectiveness
of our dynamic coach and then study why static
coaching is least useful.
Why is dynamic coaching better? Manual
analysis reveals that our coach encourages sell-
ers to be more assertive while negotiating prices,
whereas sellers without our coach give in more
easily.10 We measure assertiveness with the
average number of proposals made by sellers
〈propose a price〉: sellers with dynamic coaching
propose more often (1.93, compared to 1.32 and
1.08 for no coaching and static coaching respec-
tively). The average number of turns is 8; the mea-
sured assertiveness of our coach (1.93) shows that
we do not always suggest the seller to reject the
buyer’s proposal.
9We randomly sampled 100 dialogs from 108 for no-
coaching
10For an example, refer to Table 9 in the Appendix; com-
pare lines 24, 26, 28 (our system) against lines 4, 6, 14, 16.
Intuitively, an assertive strategy could annoy
the buyer and make them leave without complet-
ing the negotiation. But, negotiations using our
coach have the highest task completion rate. This
is likely because in addition to encouraging as-
sertiveness, our coach suggests additional action-
able tactics to make the proposal more acceptable
to the buyer. We find that 96% of the time, sellers
with dynamic coaching use additional strategies
when proposing a price, as compared to 69% in
static coaching and 61% with no coaching. For ex-
ample, our coach suggests the seller negotiate side
offers and use linguistic hedges, which can miti-
gate the assertiveness of the request. On the other
hand, in no coaching settings, sellers often pro-
pose a price without using other tactics. Lastly, the
seller often uses almost the same words as shown
in the examples retrieved by our suggestions gen-
erator in §6. This is probably because sellers find
it easier to copy the retrieved example than come
up with their own.
The effectiveness of dynamic coaching could
in large part be attributed to the tactics selec-
tor that selects optimal tactics under the current
dialog context, but sellers might still use non-
optimal tactics even if they are not suggested. To
observe the effect of this selecting, we compute
the average percentage of non-optimally applied
tactics. Dynamic coaching has the lowest rate
(26%), as compared to no coaching (33%) and
static coaching (38%). Moreover, we find that
sellers with dynamic coaching often have differ-
ent chatting styles for exchanging information (1st
stage) and negotiating price, while sellers with-
out our coach often use the same style. For ex-
ample, we show several turns from two dialogs
(D1, D2) for dynamic and no coaching, respec-
tively. In the 1st stage, our coach suggests sellers
to 〈talk informally〉 with positive sentiment:
• D1 with dynamic coaching:
Buyer: ”I’d like to buy the truck.”
Seller: ”well that’s great to hear! Only 106k
miles on it and it runs amazingly. I’ve got a lot
on my plate right now lol so I priced this lower
to move it quickly”.
• D2 with no coaching:
Buyer: ”I am interested in this truck but I have
a few questions.”
Seller: ”Absolutely, ask away!”
The sellers in both dialogs chat in a positive
and informal way. However, when negotiat-
ing the price, our coach chooses not to select
〈talk informally〉, but instead suggests formality
and politeness, and 〈express negative sentiment〉
when rejecting buyer’s proposal:
• D1 with dynamic coaching:
Buyer: ”Would you be willing to take 10k?”
Seller: ”That’s a lot lower than I was hoping.
what I could do, is if you wanted to come see it
I could knock off $1500 if you wanted to buy.”.
• D2 with no coaching:
Buyer: ”I’m looking for around 10,000.”
Seller: ”Oh no. Lol. That’s way too low!”
While the seller with our coach changes style,
the seller with no coaching stays the same. We
attribute this to the tactics selector. We also find
that dynamic coaching leads to a larger quantity
and a richer diversity of tactics.
Lastly, we focus on diversity: we show that
our coach almost always gives recommendations
at each turn and does not recommend the same tac-
tics in each dialog. Specifically, we measure how
often our coach gives no suggestions and find out
that only 1.8% of the time our coach recommends
nothing (9 out of 487 sellers’ turns). Then, we cal-
culate how often our coach gives the same tactics
within each dialog and find out that only 10% of
the time our coach gives the same suggestions (49
out of 487 sellers’ turns).
Why is static coaching even worse than no
coaching? Surprisingly, static coaching has
even lower scores in both metrics than no coaching
does. Two possibilities are considered. One is that
reading negotiation tips can limit seller’s ability to
think of other tactics, but we find that static and
dynamic coaching use similar number of unique
tactics. Then, we explore the second possibility:
it is worse to use the tactics in the tips under non-
optimal context. Therefore, we measure the av-
erage percentage of non-optimally applied strate-
gies, but only consider the tactics mentioned in the
tips. The result shows that static coaching uses
non-optimal tactics 51% of the time, compared to
46% and 38% for no coaching and dynamic coach-
ing, respectively.
8 Conclusion
This paper presents a dynamic negotiation coach
that can make measurably good recommendations
to sellers that can increase their profits. It benefits
from grounding in strategies and tactics within the
negotiation literature and uses natural language
processing and machine learning techniques to
identify and score the tactics’ likelihood of being
successful. We have tested this coach on human–
human negotiations and shown that our techniques
can substantially increase the profit of negotiators
who follow our coach’s recommendations.
A key contribution of this study is a new task
and a framework of an automated coach-in-the-
loop that provides on-the-fly autocomplete sug-
gestions to the negotiating parties. This frame-
work can seamlessly be integrated in goal-oriented
negotiation dialog systems (Lewis et al., 2017; He
et al., 2018), and it also has stand-alone educa-
tional and commercial values. For example, our
coach can provide language and strategy guidance
and help improve negotiation skills of non-expert
negotiators. In commercial settings, it has a clear
use case of assisting humans in sales and in cus-
tomer service. An additional important contribu-
tion lies in aggregating negotiation strategies from
economics and behavioral research, and proposing
novel ways to operationalize the strategies using
linguistic knowledge and resources.
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9 Appendix
Product Listing:
Listing Price: 14500
Buyer’s Target Price: 8700
Title: ”2006 Toyota 4Runner 4WD - Only 106k Miles - Clean Title”
Product Description:
”Selling my 2006 Toyota 4 Runner with only 106k original miles. The truck is in great condition with no mechanical flaws
whatsoever and a clean accident history. Got new tires about 3,000 miles ago. Always has the oil changed on time (due in
about 1k). Just got a thorough cleaning inside and a wash and wax outside (still wet in the photos). This truck has never
been offroad, but the 4WD is working perfectly from the few times we’ve been up to Tahoe in it. However, it’s a 10+ year
old truck that’s been driven, not babied and garaged all the time. It’s got some scratches, paint is not perfect, but zero body
damage.”
No Coaching:
Seller: S Buyer: B
1. B: I just saw your ad for the 4Runner, can you send
more picture of the scratches?
2. S: I don’t have pictures of the scratches but I can assure
you it’s minor
3. B: I might be interested,but all I can offer is $7500
4. S: That is very low. Can I agree to 11000?
5. B: That is too high for me, I mean it is 10 years old
with over 100,000 miles. I can possible come up to
$8,000
6. S: I can agree to 9,000 and make sure it’s had a oil
change and tire rotation before you pick it up.
7. B: If you’re willing to have the oil changed and tires
rotated, I will go as high as $8700. And I really
can’t go any higher.
8. S: That’s fine. I can agree to that.
9. B: Thanks, I’ll be right over to pick it up.
Static Coaching:
Seller: S Buyer: B
10. S: i would sell it for 1400
11. B: you got a deal. 1400 it is
12. S: sorry meant 14000
13. B: Oh c’mon. Now you got my hopes up. lol
14. S: i can go low around 12000
15. B: I’m looking at the blue book right now and that still
seems a bit high.
16. S: well the lowest i can go is 10000
17. B: You mention scratches. Lets be real. How bad are
we talking?
18. S: its 10 yrs old it has some scratches but has zero body
damage.
19. B: Ok. Without seeing any more photos, 9000 is the
best I can do.
20. S: deal
21. B: deal. Thanks!
Dynamic Coaching:
Seller: S Buyer: B
22. S: Would you be interested in buying my 4Runner?
23. B: Yes, I am possibly. interested Given that is is over 10 years old, all I can offer now is 8000.
24. Coach: Reject Buyer’s Offer and Propose a New Price, Reason the Price with Content in the Product Description
Try to Use the Word ”Would” Like This: ”Sorry, I would really need $100 for it.”
...
S: I’m sorry, but I would really need $12,000 for it. It’s in great condition!
25. B: Well given the mileage on the car it is about to be due for some major service which can be expensive. How
about 9000?
26. Coach: Reject Buyer’s Offer and Propose a New Price
Try to Use the Word ”Could” Like This: ”I could come down to $3.”
You Can Also Give the Buyer Something for Free (Gift Card) to Argue for Higher Price.
...
S: I could come down to $11,000 and include the roof rack as a bonus.
27. B: Add in a full tank of gas and a cold beer and I could do 10500.
28. Coach: Reject Buyer’s Offer and Propose a New Price
Talk About Your Personal Experience With The Product
Try to Use the Word ”Would” Like This: ”$160 would be a good price.”
...
S: I always took great care of the truck. I think $10,750 would be a reasonable price.
29. B: Deal.
30. S: Great
Table 9: Examples of collected negotiation dialogs.
